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Abstract 
Although certain pockets within the broad field of academic psychology have come to appreciate 
that eyewitness memory is more reliable than was once believed, the prevailing view, by far, is 
that eyewitness memory is unreliable – a blanket assessment that increasingly pervades the legal 
system. On the surface, this verdict seems unavoidable because (1) research convincingly shows 
that memory is malleable, and (2) eyewitness misidentifications are known to have played a role 
in most of the DNA exonerations of the innocent. However, we argue here that, like DNA 
evidence and other kinds f scientifically validated forensic evidence, eyewitness memory is 
reliable if it is not contaminated and if proper testing procedures are used. This conclusion 
applies to eyewitness memory broadly conceived, whether the test involves recognition (from a 
police lineup) or recall (during a police interview). From this perspective, eyewitness memory 
has been wrongfully convicted of mistakes that are better construed as having been committed by 
other actors in the legal system, not by the eyewitnesses themselves. Eyewitnesses typically 
provide reliable evidence on an initial, uncontaminated memory test, and this is true even for 
most of the wrongful convictions that were later reversed by DNA evidence.  
 
Keywords: eyewitness identification, confidence and accuracy, Cognitive Interview 
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 Rethinking the Reliability of Eyewitness Memory 
In the view of many, if there is one fact that has been conclusively established by 
psychological science over the last 30-40 years it is that eyewitness memory is unreliable. And in 
one important way, there is no doubt that it is. Beginning in the 1970s, Elizabeth Loftus 
discovered the once-surprising but now uncontroversial fact that memory is malleable. With 
surprising ease, for example, participants in a memory experiment can be led to believe that they 
saw a stop sign when they actually saw a yield sign (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978) or that they 
became lost in a shopping mall as a child when no such experience actually occurred (Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995).  
The unfortunate malleability of memory has had tragic consequences in the legal system. 
For example, during the 1980s, a moral panic over day-care sexual abuse was later attributed to 
the unintentional implantation of false memories in young children during suggestive interviews 
(Bruck & Ceci, 1995; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman & Bruck, 1994). Similarly, 
during the repressed memory epidemic in the 1990s, adult patients in psychotherapy sometimes 
recovered childhood memories of having been sexually abused by their parents. Incredibly, 
parents were occasionally charged and convicted of sexual abuse based on evidence consisting of 
nothing more than the recent recovery of a long-repressed memory from childhood. Only later 
did it become clear that many of those apparently recovered memories were actually 
unintentionally implanted by psychotherapists as they repeatedly probed a patient's childhood 
memories using techniques like "guided imagery" (Loftus, 2003; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994). 
Although those moral panics have largely subsided, the malleability of memory continues to 
plague the legal system because events that occur during ordinary criminal investigations can 
have the effect of contaminating the memory of eyewitnesses, who then end up misidentifying 
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innocent suspects or reporting events that did not occur. Indeed, eyewitness misidentifications 
are known to have played a role in 70% of the 350 convictions that have been overturned based 
on DNA evidence since 1989 (Innocence Project, 2017).  
In light of psychological research demonstrating how malleable memory is, and in light 
of the tragic consequences this has had in the legal system, it is perhaps not surprising that 
psychological science has rendered a verdict that now appears in virtually every textbook that 
addresses the issue: Eyewitness memory is unreliable. The purpose of this article is to suggest 
that it is time for that verdict to change. Against the notion that eyewitness memory is unreliable, 
we propose the following alternative perspective:  
 
Just as is true of other kinds of scientifically validated forensic evidence, eyewitness 
memory is reliable when it is not contaminated and when proper testing procedures 
are used.  
 
This perspective concerning the reliability of eyewitness memory conflicts with what most 
researchers appear to believe and with what virtually every textbook that addresses the matter 
has to say about it.  
The Prevailing Verdict on Eyewitness Memory 
Evidence supporting the idea that eyewitness memory is widely perceived to be 
inherently unreliable is abundant. First, a search of Google using the exact (quoted) phrase 
"eyewitness memory is unreliable" yields 2250 hits. By contrast, a search of the exact phrase 
"eyewitness memory is reliable" yields only 2 hits (search conducted on Feb. 11, 2017). Second, 
the Wikipedia entry on eyewitness identification (retrieved on Feb. 11, 2017) quotes the late U.S. 
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Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. as saying that "At least since United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Court has recognized the inherently suspect qualities of 
eyewitness identification evidence, and described the evidence as 'notoriously unreliable.'" The 
rest of the entry is written as if to validate Justice Brennan’s decades-old impression of 
eyewitness memory. Third, many psychology textbooks convey the message that eyewitness 
memory is unreliable, as readers can easily confirm for themselves if there is an introductory 
psychology text (or, perhaps, a social psychology text or memory text) on a nearby bookshelf. 
The following paragraph from a freely available online psychology text seems representative and 
will likely sound familiar to most readers: 
Psychological researchers who began programs in the 1970s, however, have consistently articulated 
concerns about the accuracy of eyewitness identification. Using various methodologies, such as filmed 
events and live staged crimes, eyewitness researchers have noted that mistaken identification rates can be 
surprisingly high and that eyewitnesses often express certainty when they mistakenly select someone from 
a lineup. Although their findings were quite compelling to the researchers themselves, it was not until the 
late 1990s that criminal justice personnel began taking the research seriously (Cognitive Psychology and 
Cognitive Neuroscience/Memory, 2017).  
 
Are there any conditions under which eyewitness memory is highly reliable? If so, this textbook 
does not say. In our experience, the most any textbook ever says beyond listing the many ways in 
which eyewitness memory can go wrong (complete with illustrations of real-life tragedies 
attributed to eyewitness misidentification) is to briefly acknowledge that eyewitness memory is 
not always inaccurate. Nearly every textbook treatment of eyewitness memory that we have seen 
is written as if the author's primary responsibility is to disabuse readers of the dangerous idea 
that eyewitness memory might be a reliable form of forensic evidence.  
Although we have not surveyed every psychology textbook, we feel safe in suggesting 
that no textbook leaves a reader with the impression that eyewitness memory is reliable in the 
same way that DNA evidence and fingerprint evidence are reliable (National Research Council, 
2009; Thompson, Tangen & McCarthy, 2014), namely, when the evidence is not contaminated 
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and when proper testing procedures are used. Instead, most textbooks leave the impression that 
almost everyone in our field has, which is that eyewitness memory is simply unreliable. This 
widespread impression is now enshrined in amicus briefs on the reliability of eyewitness 
memory that have been filed by the American Psychological Association (APA). These legal 
documents state that their conclusions about eyewitness memory are based on scientific research 
and that they enjoy almost unanimous support in the field. A recent (American Psychological 
Association, 2014) amicus brief states:  
Importantly, error rates can be high even among the most confident witnesses. Researchers have performed 
studies that track, in addition to identification accuracy, the subjects’ estimates of their confidence in their 
identifications. In one article reporting results from an empirical study, researchers found that among 
witnesses who made positive identifications, as many as 40 percent were mistaken, yet they declared 
themselves to be 90 percent to 100 percent confident in the accuracy of their identifications (pp. 17-18). 
Another APA amicus brief (American Psychological Association, 2016) asserts that: 
 Moreover, although the unreliability of eyewitness identifications is well known in the scientific 
community and among many lawyers, it is not understood by lay juries (p. 9).  
Similar assertions can be found in a recent amicus brief filed by the Innocence Project (e.g., 
Innocence Project, 2013). 
It is not hard to understand how the field of psychology arrived at its generally negative 
assessment of the reliability of eyewitness memory. At least u til the 1970s, and to some extent 
still today, the legal system operated as if the testimony of a credible and confident eyewitness 
was essentially infallible. Experimental psychologists in general (and Elizabeth Loftus in 
particular) awakened the legal system to the fact that eyewitness memory is malleable and is 
therefore not immune to contamination. It was a groundbreaking development that inspired new 
recommendations about forensic interviews and eyewitness identification procedures (e.g., 
Newlin, et al., 2015; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero & Brimacombe, 1998; Technical 
Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999; Police and Criminal Evidence code, 2011). 
Despite these positive developments, we submit that the once surprising revelation about the 
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malleability of eyewitness memory has led to a severe overcorrection such that the field now 
regards eyewitness memory not only as being potentially unreliable but as being inherently 
unreliable. In our view, the evidence does not support this idea and instead clearly refutes it.  
When is Forensic Evidence Reliable? The DNA analogy 
Before addressing the issue of how reliable eyewitness memory is, it is important to 
consider two points about when forensic evidence qualifies as being reliable. First, few would 
dispute the idea that, as a general rule, forensic evidence of any kind can be contaminated. Thus, 
the fact that eyewitness memory can be contaminated is not a distinguishing feature of that type 
of evidence. Even DNA evidence can be contaminated, either before it arrives at the laboratory 
or if improper testing procedures are used in the laboratory itself. Indeed, there are multiple 
examples of evidence becoming contaminated with the DNA of an innocent person, ultimately 
resulting in a wrongful conviction (Opar, 2006; Thompson, 2013). Nevertheless, such cases are 
rare because police investigators and forensic DNA scientists are well aware of the risk of 
contamination, and they take appropriate steps to avoid that problem. With regard to laboratory 
protocols, for example, the FBI has issued a document entitled "Quality Assurance Standards for 
Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories" (2011), which spells out requirements for annual laboratory 
audits and semiannual proficiency testing for DNA analysts to ensure that an accredited DNA 
laboratory is in compliance with FBI standards. When the forensic evidence is not contaminated 
and proper testing protocols are followed, DNA evidence is extraordinarily reliable (National 
Research Council, 2009). Thus, the mere fact that forensic evidence can be easily contaminated 
is not an automatic indictment of its reliability. 
The second important point about judging the reliability of forensic evidence concerns 
the interpretation of a test result when (1) the evidence was not contaminated and (2) the test was 
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properly performed. Critically, even under these conditions, a test result can be inconclusive. 
Consider again DNA evidence. Does a properly conducted DNA test of uncontaminated 
evidence from a crime scene conclusively identify the perpetrator or conclusively exclude an 
innocent suspect every time? Of course not. The results of a DNA test are summarized in a graph 
known as an "electropherogram," which displays a series of sharp peaks reflecting the amount of 
DNA detected at various locations (loci) on the chromosomal material (Thompson, Ford, Doom, 
Raymer & Krane, 2003). In a pristine single-source DNA profile, the electropherogram will 
exhibit either one or two peaks (representing alleles) at each of 20 different loci.1 If the peaks of 
an unknown DNA profile obtained from the crime scene evidence match all of the peaks from 
the known DNA profile obtained from a suspect, then the odds that the unknown sample was 
deposited by another person (not by the suspect) are infinitesimally small. However, sometimes, 
the crime-scene DNA evidence is degraded such that only a partial DNA profile is obtained (i.e., 
peaks are evident for only some of the 20 loci). This can occur even though the crime-scene 
evidence was not contaminated and even though proper testing procedures were followed in the 
crime laboratory. In that case, the results (i.e., a partial match) might not conclusively implicate 
the suspect. 
An important component of a DNA test result is that it includes an indication of how 
definitive the results are. For example, the test result might indicate that while a partial profile of 
an unknown individual is consistent with the full DNA profile of the known suspect, there is a 1 
in 4 chance that it would also be consistent with the full DNA profile of a randomly selected 
individual from the population. Under those conditions, the DNA test result would not constitute 
strong evidence against the suspect. Other test results might put the odds at 1 in 100, 1 in 100 
                                                 
1 In 1997, the FBI selected 13 loci to constitute the core of the United States national database, CODIS, but as of 
January 1, 2017, the number of core loci was increased to 20. 
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thousand, or 1 in 100 trillion, depending on how intact the DNA on the crime-scene evidence is. 
The lower the odds that a randomly selected individual would yield a profile consistent with the 
DNA profile from the crime scene evidence, the more certain one can be that the unknown DNA 
belongs to the suspect. 
If it often happened that a properly conducted DNA test result associated with a random 
match probability of 1 in 4 was used to convict suspects, many innocent people would end up in 
prison. However, as tragic as that would be, those wrongful convictions would not be an 
indication that DNA tests are inherently unreliable. Instead, it would be an indication that the 
criminal justice system is making an error by ignoring the random match probability that 
accompanied the DNA test result. From this perspective, forensic evidence is reliable not 
because it provides accurate information whenever it is used in an effort to determine if a suspect 
is innocent or guilty. Even DNA evidence is not reliable in that sense. Instead, forensic evidence 
is reliable if it includes a valid indication of how definitive the evidence is. 
As with DNA, no account of the reliability of eyewitness memory is complete without 
taking into consideration the degree to which eyewitnesses can inform police investigators that 
the information they just provided is or is not definitive. The equivalent of the random match 
probability in eyewitness memory is the confidence expressed by the eyewitness the first time 
memory is assessed. With that definition of reliability in mind, we next consider research 
pertaining to the reliability of eyewitness memory, first when it is tested by recognition (using a 
lineup) and then when it is tested by recall (during a police interview). Although these two 
research literatures are usually considered separately, our argument will be that the same lesson 
has been learned in both cases, namely, that eyewitness memory is reliable when the evidence is 
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not contaminated, when proper procedures are followed, and when the confidence expressed by 
the eyewitness is taken into account.    
Eyewitness Identification Evidence from a Lineup (Recognition) 
Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger (2015) proposed that eyewitness 
identification evidence from a police lineup is highly reliable in the sense described above. That 
is, like DNA evidence, on an initial test of uncontaminated memory using proper procedures, 
low confidence implies low accuracy, and high confidence implies high accuracy. This is not to 
suggest that high-confidence eyewitness evidence can achieve the astronomically high levels of 
accuracy that can be achieved with DNA evidence (e.g., when the random match probability is 1 
in 100 trillion), but we do suggest that high-confidence IDs can achieve levels of accuracy that 
are far more impressive than is generally believed to be the case.  
Recently, Wixted and Wells (2017) reviewed many laboratory studies and plotted suspect 
ID accuracy as a function of confidence on a 100-point scale. The dependent measure used in 
their analyses addresses the question of greatest interest to judges and juries in a case involving 
eyewitness identification: Given that the witness identified the suspect with a certain level of 
confidence, what is the probability that the suspect ID was accurate? Figure 1 reproduces their 
summary figure based on 15 simulated crime studies. Obviously, high-confidence implies very 
high accuracy and low-confidence implies much lower accuracy. Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark 
and Wells (2016) reported similar results from the Houston Police Department field study, 
shown here in Figure 2. The latter study is particularly important because it provides evidence 
that in actual practice (with real eyewitnesses), memory is reliable on an initial uncontaminated 
test using proper testing procedures. 
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Figure 1. Suspect ID accuracy (proportion correct) 
averaged across 15 studies with comparable scaling
on the confidence (x) axis (Wixted & Wells, 2017).
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Figure 2. Estimated suspect ID accuracy (proportion
correct) as a function of confidence for the data from
the Houston Police Department field study (Wixted, 
Mickes, Clark, Dunn, & Wells, 2016).
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Only the first memory test counts 
The field of psychology has been slow to appreciate the strong relationship between 
confidence and accuracy – and, therefore, to appreciate how reliable eyewitness identification is 
– for at least three reasons. First, memory is malleable and the very act of testing memory 
contaminates it by making it stronger than it was before. Thus, on subsequent memory tests, 
eyewitnesses will experience a stronger memory match signal than they did on the first test and 
more confidently identify a suspect – whether that suspect is innocent or guilty (e.g., Steblay & 
Dysart, 2016). The implication is that only the first test of an eyewitness's memory can provide 
untainted forensic evidence (Wixted et al., 2015), and that fact needs to be taken into 
consideration in any discussion about the reliability of eyewitness memory. Many have conflated 
contaminated memory tests (namely, the eyewitness identification test that occurs at trial) and 
uncontaminated memory tests (namely, the initial memory test conducted using a properly 
constructed lineup) when forming an opinion about the reliability of eyewitness memory. Yes, 
contaminated memory evidence is unreliable (just as contaminated DNA evidence is), but no, 
that fact does not indicate that eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable. To ask whether or not 
eyewitness evidence (or DNA evidence or fingerprint evidence) is reliable is to ask whether or 
not it is reliable when the evidence is not contaminated, when proper testing procedures are used, 
and when confidence is taken into account. For eyewitness identification, because only the first 
test provides a test of uncontaminated memory, its reliability must be judged in relation to that 
first test. 
The “correlation” between confidence and accuracy is irrelevant  
The second reason why the field has been slow to appreciate that eyewitness 
identification evidence is reliable is that early studies into the confidence-accuracy relationship 
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suggested that the relationship is weak or, at best, moderate even on an initial uncontaminated 
test using a pristine lineup procedure (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 
1995). If that were true, it would certainly support the claim that eyewitness identification 
evidence is inherently unreliable. However, it is now understood that the original conclusion 
about a weak-to-moderate confidence-accuracy relationship was based on the use of a 
problematic statistic – the point-biserial correlation coefficient – to measure that relationship 
(Juslin, Winman & Olson., 1996; Wixted & Wells, 2017). The most straightforward way to 
communicate the confidence-accuracy relationship for cases in which a suspect has been 
identified from a lineup is to simply plot suspect ID accuracy as a function of confidence 
(Mickes, 2015), as we have done here in Figures 1 and 2. When plotted that way, the confidence-
accuracy relation is impressively strong.  
Suboptimal memory conditions 
The third reason why eyewitness identification evidence has long been judged to be 
unreliable is the belief that for a strong confidence-accuracy relationship to hold, not only must 
an appropriate test be administered, but the memory conditions at the time of the crime must be 
favorable as well. For example, the “optimality hypothesis” (Deffenbacher, 1980, 2008) holds 
that confidence becomes less indicative of accuracy under suboptimal conditions (e.g., high 
stress, the presence of a weapon, racial differences between the witness and the perpetrator, short 
exposure duration, long retention interval, etc.). However, the evidence collected to date suggests 
that variables such as these do not appreciably affect the accuracy of initial identifications made 
with high confidence (Mickes, 2015). The relevant studies were reviewed by Wixted and Wells 
(2017), with key results summarized in their Figures 4c (weapon present or absent), 4d (weapon 
present or absent again), 4f (same-vs.-cross-race), 4h (short vs. long retention intervals), 4i (short 
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vs. long retention intervals and short vs. long exposure durations), 4m (full vs. divided attention), 
4n (short vs. long retention interval again), and 4p (short vs. long retention interval again). 
Although these variables had the expected negative effect on the overall accuracy of memory 
(because, for example, memory fades following a long retention interval), they did not diminish 
the accuracy of suspect IDs made with high confidence.  
The results of these studies help to further clarify the difference between “reliability” and 
overall “accuracy.” To say that a long retention interval reduces the overall accuracy of 
eyewitness memory means that eyewitness will make more mistakes following a long retention 
interval compared to a short retention interval. However, it does not automatically follow that the 
information provided by eyewitnesses when they make a suspect ID under unfavorable memory 
conditions is any less reliable. For example, following a short retention interval, almost all 
suspect IDs might be accurate and also be accompanied by high confidence. Following a long 
retention interval, some suspect IDs might be accurate and accompanied by high confidence, but 
most suspect IDs might be inaccurate and accompanied by low confidence. Overall suspect ID 
accuracy will be lower after a long retention interval because most of what is remembered 
consists of low-confidence, low-accuracy IDs, but reliability might be unaffected in that high-
confidence IDs, although less likely to occur, are as accurate as ever. It is therefore no 
contradiction to say that variables like high stress, weapon focus, and long retention interval 
reduce overall accuracy without necessarily affecting the reliability of suspect IDs made with 
high confidence. 
The results of these laboratory studies help to make sense of the police department field 
study results summarized here in Figure 2. In the Robbery Division of the Houston Police 
Department, more than 60% of the IDs are cross-race IDs, and more than 70% of robberies 
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involve the presence of a weapon (Wells, Campbell, Li & Swindle, 2016). Given that a weapon 
was often present, one can reasonably assume that eyewitness stress is often high. Even so, just 
as in laboratory studies involving other variables that negatively affect overall accuracy, high-
confidence IDs were estimated to be highly accurate. 
With these findings in mind, it is worth revisiting the DNA exoneration cases – the ones 
in which 70% were based on eyewitness misidentifications. In his 2011 book Convicting the 
Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, Garrett (2011) analyzed trial materials for 
161 DNA exonerees who had been misidentified by one or more eyewitnesses in a court of law. 
In every case, the eyewitness testified with high confidence at trial that the defendant was the 
perpetrator. However, IDs that occur at trial are not initial IDs. Therefore, by itself, that fact only 
shows that contaminated memory is unreliable (something that was not widely appreciated in the 
pre-Loftus era but now is, at least among experimental psychologists). Critically, in 57% of those 
cases, information was available about the level of confidence expressed on the initial 
(presumably uncontaminated) memory test. In every one of those cases, the same eyewitnesses 
who were highly confident in their misidentifications at trial were, at best, initially uncertain. In 
other words, on the one and only test that counts (the initial uncontaminated memory test), the 
result was a lot like an inconclusive DNA test that comes back indicating that the DNA profile 
on the crime scene evidence, although consistent with the suspect, is also consistent with a high 
proportion of the population. Presumably, most prosecutors would not try to convict someone on 
the strength of such weak evidence alone. The fact that similarly weak eyewitness evidence from 
an initial test ended up convicting a large number of innocent defendants does not mean that 
eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable. Instead, it means that the legal system ignored the 
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results of a valid initial test based on uncontaminated eyewitness evidence and instead 
unwittingly used contaminated eyewitness evidence to win a conviction.  
Eyewitness Evidence from a Police Interview (Recall) 
The considerations discussed above pertain to eyewitness identification (recognition 
memory), but similar considerations apply to information obtained from interviewing 
eyewitnesses about a crime they observed (recall memory). For example, just as lineup 
administrators can distort eyewitness recognition to generate incorrect identifications, so too can 
interviewers distort eyewitness recall to generate incorrect descriptions. Such error-inducing 
techniques include (a) asking suggestive questions or otherwise introducing post-event 
misinformation (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978), (b) asking an abundance of closed questions (vs. 
open-ended questions: Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz & Abbott, 2007), and (c) 
encouraging/enticing witnesses to guess (vs. providing an option not to respond: Earhart, La 
Rooy, Brubacher & Lamb, 2014). When these avoidable error-inducing interview techniques are 
avoided, however, as in the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) or the National 
Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) protocol (Orbach, Hershkowitz, 
Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin & Horowitz, 2000), witness descriptions can be quite accurate. We next 
consider research on the accuracy of information that is elicited from adults using proper 
interview techniques in laboratory studies and police department field studies. 
Laboratory Studies of Eyewitness Recall 
Laboratory studies typically have participants view a mock-crime (as in laboratory 
studies of eyewitness identification), after which different interviewing strategies are compared 
(e.g., the Cognitive Interview vs. a standard police interview protocol). Although most studies 
are concerned with the ability of a structured interview like the Cognitive Interview to elicit 
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more information than alternative techniques, many studies also report the accuracy of the 
obtained information. In an early meta-analysis of the literature, Koehnken, Milne, Memon and 
Bull (1999) determined that the Cognitive Interview elicited significantly more information than 
alternative interviews. More important for present purposes, they also found that “…accuracy (as 
measured by the proportion of all witness statements that were correct) was as high or slightly 
higher in the CI interviews (accuracy rate = 0.85) than in the comparison interviews (0.82)” (p. 
63). Comparable accuracy scores were recently reported by Rivard, Fisher, Robertson and Hirn 
Mueller (2014) in a more realistic study in which participants were asked to recall the details of a 
meeting they had attended at a training center for federal investigators 3 to 43 days earlier. The 
interviewers were staff members who conduct training programs on investigative interviewing at 
the training center. The Cognitive Interview again outperformed a standard interview in terms of 
the amount of information elicited (the usual result). Critically, of the recalled information that 
could be corroborated (based on records of the meeting provided by the training facility), the 
accuracy rates were 88% correct and 87% correct for the Cognitive Interview and a standard 
interview protocol, respectively. Accuracy rates that fall in the 85% to 90% correct range 
indicate that eyewitness recall for details is not perfect, but such results are hard to reconcile with 
the prevailing notion that eyewitness memory is simply unreliable. 
The high accuracy rates noted above, which were found in controlled laboratory studies, 
are instructive, but may not be representative of performance in real-world investigations. Note 
that most laboratory studies (1) use undergraduate student witnesses, who may have better 
memory or verbal skills than typical victims and witnesses of real crime, and (2) use graduate 
Research Assistant interviewers, who may ask easier questions than real-world police 
investigators – although as noted above Rivard et al. (2014) used non-student witnesses and 
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professional interviewers (see also Mosser, Fisher, Molinaro, Satin & Manon, 2015). 
Furthermore, laboratory studies are often designed to detect differences across conditions and so 
they are engineered to avoid ceiling and floor effects, in which case the absolute levels of 
performance may not be informative. We should therefore look to field studies, of actual victims 
and witnesses to crime, to see whether the high witness accuracy rates still hold.  
Field Studies of Eyewitness Recall 
In an early police department field study, Fisher, Geiselman and Amador (1989) trained 7 
experienced detectives from the Robbery Division of the Metro-Dade Police Department to use 
the Cognitive Interview and compared their performance against 9 untrained, but equally 
experienced, detectives. As in laboratory studies, the trained detectives elicited considerably 
more information than the untrained detectives did. Because the ground truth of recalled 
information was unknown, it was estimated using various sources of corroboration (mainly 
reports from other witnesses interviewed immediately after the crime). Overall corroboration 
rates exceeded 93% for both the Cognitive Interview and the standard interview protocol. These 
findings suggest that, if anything, real eyewitnesses may be slightly more accurate than what is 
suggested by laboratory studies (see also van Koppen & Locun, 1993; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). 
One obvious limitation of this interpretation is that the measure of accuracy used in this study – 
corroboration across witnesses – is imperfect, as it is possible for two witnesses to be consistent 
with each other, but both are wrong. More recent studies of real-crime witnesses relied on purer 
measures of accuracy. 
 Several studies have taken advantage of the fact that crimes are sometimes captured on 
closed-circuit television (CCTV). Those CCTV images can then be used to directly validate the 
information later recalled by eyewitnesses. In the first study making use of CCTV images, 
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Woolnough and MacLeod (2001) examined archived police records and identified eight 
incidents of assault that involved both a victim and a bystander. Most of the elicited information 
was about the crime events, not descriptions of the perpetrator. The action details recalled by the 
witnesses included events such as the victim being knocked to the ground, a man and a woman 
having an argument and pushing each other, good Samaritans breaking up a fight, etc. In this 
study, both victims and bystanders were found to be highly accurate: Both achieved accuracy 
scores of 96% correct. In another CCTV-corroborated field study, eyewitnesses provided 
descriptions of the perpetrators of armed robberies in Oslo, Norway (Fahsing, Ask & Granhag, 
2004). Of the verifiable attributes, 87% were correct. Again, findings like these seem impossible 
to reconcile with the notion that eyewitness memory is generally unreliable. 
Keep in mind that our focus is on an initial test of memory that occurs prior to 
experiences that may contaminate witness memory (just as DNA evidence can be contaminated). 
A good illustration of how contamination can reduce the reliability of information obtained from 
a police interview comes from an archival police study of 29 people who witnessed the murder 
of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh (Granhag, Ask, Rebelius, Ohman, & Giolla, 2013). In 
this case, only 58% of the reported attributes were correct, as corroborated by CCTV. According 
to the authors, the most likely explanation for the poor performance was memory contamination 
that occurred because, prior to being interviewed, the witnesses were gathered together and 
discussed the event. These findings underscore the fact that our claims about the surprisingly 
high reliability of eyewitness memory pertain to tests of memory that are conducted prior to 
memory contamination. 
 In all, laboratory studies of eyewitness memory that employ generally accepted 
interviewing protocols and do not intentionally provide misleading information or entice 
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witnesses to guess find that accuracy is quite high (ca. 85% - 90%). Field studies of police 
interviews with victims and witnesses of real crime show, if anything, even higher rates of 
accuracy. On the surface, this finding might seem hard to reconcile with reports showing that 
police interviewers often do not follow optimal interview procedures (Fisher, Geiselman, & 
Amador, 1987; Snook & Keating, 2011). However, analyses of police interviews show that the 
police likely elicit less information than is potentially available; they do not typically use 
techniques that increase the risk of eliciting inaccurate information. They elicit less information 
than they could because they typically do not make use of empirically validated techniques for 
maximizing the quantity of recalled information, such as the techniques used in the Cognitive 
Interview (e.g., context reinstatement, witness-compatible questions, encourage active witness 
participation, etc.). Nevertheless, at least when interviewing cooperative witnesses, the police 
rarely ask blatantly suggestive questions or offer misleading information, procedures that are 
known to contribute to witness error. Thus, we would expect to find that training police to use 
the Cognitive Interview increases the amount of information elicited but not the accuracy of 
witness reports because accuracy is already high. 
 Eyewitness Confidence and Recall Accuracy 
 We noted earlier, when discussing eyewitness identification (recognition memory), that, 
under proper testing conditions, confidence was a good indicator of accuracy. How well does 
eyewitness confidence indicate accuracy when eyewitnesses are describing a recollected event 
(recall memory)? Several laboratory and field studies converge on the conclusion that eyewitness 
confidence also predicts recall accuracy. 
 Roberts and Higham (2002) conducted one of the first laboratory studies to examine 
confidence as a predictor of eyewitness recall accuracy. After watching a videotape of a 
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Figure 3. Observed relationship between
proportion correct and confidence from Roberts
and Higham (2002).
simulated robbery, laboratory witnesses were interviewed about their recollections of the event. 
Following an initial free narrative report, witnesses were asked follow-up questions to elaborate 
on their initial recollections. Witnesses were then asked to make confidence judgments (using a 
1-to-7 scale) about each detail that 
was reported earlier. We estimated 
the overall number of correct and 
incorrect details for each level of 
confidence from their Figure 1 and 
then computed the probability that 
a recalled detail was correct for 
each level of confidence. That is, 
for each level of confidence, we 
computed # correct details / (# 
correct details + # incorrect 
details) to create the recall version of a CAC plot. Because very few details were recollected with 
confidence ratings of 1 or 2, we collapsed across those two confidence ratings. The results are 
shown here in Figure 3. Obviously, as with the recognition studies considered earlier, confidence 
was strongly related to accuracy, and high confidence was associated with high accuracy.  
Odinot, Wolters, and van Koppen (2009) extended the Roberts and Higham (2002) 
laboratory study to a more naturalistic and stressful setting, an armed robbery of a supermarket. 
Three months after the crime, Odinot et al. interviewed eyewitnesses about details of the crime. 
After the witnesses described the event, the experimenters asked the witnesses to make 
confidence judgments (1-7 scale) about each detail they had provided earlier. Odinot et al. (2009) 
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Figure 4. Observed relationship between proportion 
correct and confidence from Odinot et al. (2009).
measured the relationship between confidence in recollected details and the accuracy of those 
recollections by computing a gamma correlation coefficient (which, in their study, came to 0.38), 
but that approach suffers from the same problem as the point-biserial correlation coefficient used 
in eyewitness identification studies in that it is capable of masking a strong relationship 
(Roediger, Wixted & DeSoto, 2012). Instead of computing a correlation coefficient, it is more 
informative to simply plot the relationship between confidence and accuracy in a manner similar 
to the CAC plots shown here in Figures 1 and 2. The information needed to do so was reported 
by Odinot et al. (2009) in their Table 2. To create the recall version of the CAC plot, we 
averaged across different 
categories (person descriptions, 
object descriptions, and action 
details) for the nine central 
witnesses interviewed in that 
study. In addition, because many 
responses were associated with 
high confidence (a rating of 7), 
whereas relatively few responses 
were made with confidence 
ratings of 1 through 6, we 
computed weighted averages across categories to create a 3-point scale (low, medium and high 
confidence). Low confidence consisted of ratings of 1 through 3 (44 ratings in all), medium 
confidence consisted of ratings 4 through 6 (203 ratings), and high confidence consisted of 
ratings of 7 (326 ratings). Figure 4 shows that proportion correct increased from .61 to .85 as 
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confidence increased from low to high. Again, high-confidence recollections, at 85% correct, 
despite being less than perfect, cannot be characterized as being unreliable. 
Even though the above findings are encouraging, we suspect that they may underestimate 
the predictive power of confidence, as in both the Roberts and Higham (2002) and Odinot et al. 
(2009) studies, the confidence judgments were made only after a delay (after witnesses reported 
several related details), i.e., these were not contemporaneous confidence judgments.  Requiring 
interviewees to make a confidence judgment immediately after each recalled fact would disrupt 
the natural flow of a properly conducted interview. (We note that, although unnatural for a 
witness interview, it is very natural for witnesses doing a recognition/identification test to be 
asked immediately after each decision to indicate their level of confidence; e.g., You just picked 
number 5; how confident are you about that decision?) In order to examine confidence 
judgments made spontaneously within a recall task, but not disrupt the natural flow of a witness 
interview, other indirect measures of confidence can be used. Two such measures, which we 
discuss below, are (1) noticing when witnesses spontaneously use verbal expressions of 
(un)certainty, and (2) allowing witnesses to withhold low-confidence recollections. 
 Paulo, Albuquerque, and Bull (2016) showed experimental witnesses a videotape of a 
simulated crime and then interviewed the witnesses by eliciting mainly uninterrupted narrative  
descriptions of the event. Whereas most of the witness statements were unqualified (e.g., “it was 
a red shirt”), they sometimes uttered verbal expressions to convey their uncertainty (e.g., “I think 
[or “maybe”] it was a red shirt.”). In keeping with the general principle that certainty indicates 
heightened accuracy, unqualified statements were correct 90% of the time, whereas statements 
preceded by expressions of uncertainty were correct only 65% of the time. Thus, even though the 
interviewers did not formally ask witnesses to indicate their level of certainty, spontaneous 
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measures of (un)certainty still emerged to distinguish between highly accurate and less accurate 
witness recollections.  
 Finally, witness confidence may be assessed unobtrusively by allowing witnesses to 
withhold uncertain responses or to say “I don’t know” (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). Presumably, 
if given the opportunity to withhold a response, witnesses will withhold the low-confidence 
responses. In a test of this hypothesis, Evans and Fisher (2011) showed experimental witnesses a 
brief crime video and then tested them with either free recall, cued recall, or Yes/No questions. 
Moreover, witnesses were either permitted to withhold responses (say “I don’t know”) or they 
were forced to answer all questions. As might be expected, witnesses were less confident about 
responses they withheld (and were later asked to report) than responses they provided 
voluntarily. In agreement with the results summarized in Figures 3 and 4, witnesses were very 
accurate for the high-confidence answers they provided voluntarily (probability correct = .91), 
but accuracy declined considerably when they were forced to also provide low-confidence 
responses (probability correct = .79). 
Conclusion 
 Our main message is that when investigators probe eyewitness memory, either via 
identification procedures (recognition tests) or interviews (recall tests), the information they 
receive is likely to be very reliable if the following conditions are met: (1) witnesses were not 
previously exposed to distorting/contaminating information, (2) the witness’ memory is being 
probed for the first time, (3) witnesses are not “tricked” into providing desired information (e.g., 
through the use of biased lineups or suggestive interview questions), (4) the witness’s 
metacognitive monitoring guides his/her responding (either by withholding a response if 
uncertain or explicitly reporting his/her level of confidence), and (5) the investigator is sensitive 
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to the witness’s level of confidence (relying on high-confidence responses while attaching less 
weight to low-confidence responses). When such conditions are met, eyewitness memory is 
likely to be reliable – both in the laboratory and in the field – whether the test involves 
recognition or recall.  When such conditions are not met, eyewitness memory may be unreliable 
– but that is hardly because of a faulty memory system. 
These considerations indicate how the message from experimental psychology – namely, 
that eyewitness memory is inherently unreliable and that eyewitness confidence should be 
disregarded – is incomplete, to say the least. The evidence we have reviewed here indicates that 
eyewitness memory is reliable in the same way that DNA evidence is reliable. When proper 
procedures are used, both DNA tests and eyewitness memory tests are accompanied by an 
indication of how reliable the information is. For DNA tests, that information consists of the 
random match probability. For memory tests, that information consists of an eyewitness’s 
confidence in the information that was just provided (with respect to either an ID made from a 
lineup or an answer provided in response to an interview question). Ignoring that critical piece of 
information can lead to tragic errors, including wrongful convictions of the innocent. Indeed, 
ignoring the low confidence expressed by eyewitnesses on the initial memory test is exactly how 
most of the innocent defendants who were supposedly wrongfully convicted because of the 
unreliability of eyewitness memory ended up in prison in the first place (only to be exonerated 
by DNA evidence years later). The same would be true if people were routinely convicted based 
on inconclusive DNA evidence. Fortunately, so far as we know, the legal system does not make 
that mistake when the forensic evidence involves a DNA test (i.e., if the test is inconclusive, that 
evidence is not used to prosecute), but it does make that mistake when the forensic evidence 
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consists of an eyewitness memory test. Blaming the inevitable wrongful convictions on the 
unreliability of eyewitness memory is pointing the finger of blame in the wrong direction. 
It might be argued that the perspective we have advanced here is defensible in theory but, 
in practice, eyewitness evidence is so often mishandled that it is nevertheless valid to assert that 
eyewitness memory is (for all practical purposes anyway) inherently unreliable. However, for 
two reasons, we believe that this is not a viable position. First, keep in mind that in the DNA 
exoneration cases for which it could be determined what happened at the initial ID, the witnesses 
did not express high confidence. In fact, in none of the cases for which it could be determined 
what happened at the time of the initial ID was a witness both mistaken and highly confident 
(Garrett, 2011). These findings provide direct evidence that, by the time of the first ID in a 
typical police investigation, eyewitness memory is usually not contaminated to the point where a 
mistaken ID will happen with high confidence. That obviously can happen, but the available 
evidence suggests that it is not a frequent occurrence. If it were, one would expect to find many 
cases in which the initial ID in a DNA exoneration case were made with high confidence. So far, 
there is no such evidence.  
Second, many jurisdictions have adopted much improved eyewitness memory protocols 
in recent years. A recent DOJ memo, for example, instructed all federal law enforcement 
agencies to adopt "best practices" eyewitness identification protocols according to which a lineup 
should be fair (i.e., the suspect should not stand out), that it should contain only one suspect and 
that an initial statement of confidence should be obtained (Yates, 2017). In federal trials 
involving eyewitness identification evidence, should juries be told that eyewitness memory is 
inherently unreliable even if the DOJ guidelines were followed? That seems inappropriate to us. 
Instead, just as is true of trials involving DNA evidence, the jury should hear arguments about 
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whether or not proper testing protocols were adhered to so the jury can make an independent 
judgment about the reliability of the evidence. When memory is not contaminated and proper 
testing procedures are followed, eyewitness memory is clearly reliable. In our opinion, the cause 
of justice is not served by suggesting otherwise. 
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